In this paper we study variations of the standard Hotelling-Downs model of spatial competition, where each agent attracts the clients in a restricted neighborhood, each client randomly picks one attractive agent for service.
Introduction
Ever since the seminal works by Hotellings [11] and Downs [5] , the HotellingDowns model has been applied to many problems, ranging from determining the standpoint of a election candidate to choosing locations for commercial facilities [13, 2, 20] . In the model, two firms choose shop locations in a line market. Customers are distributed along the line. Assume the products of the firms are uniform, the customers always go to the closer shop. Hence, one firm can always attract more customers by moving towards the competitor's location. Therefore, both firms choose the median point in the unique stable equilibrium, attracting an equal number of customers. This also sheds light upon the phenomenon that the candidates' standpoints in a political election are often close.
In political election scenarios, the assumption is taken to model the standpoints of the candidates in [19, 6] that every candidate has an ideal location in mind and cares about how close the winner's location is to the ideal location. Models with runoff voting are studied in [15, 3, 21] , where the voting takes place in multiple rounds and only a subset of candidates from the previous round enter the next round. In commercial facility location problems, more complex models are proposed to address other issues. For example, when making decisions, customers consider the transportation cost caused by getting service. Such competition that involves both location and pricing are considered by Hotelling's original model [11] , and some other existing works [4, 18, 22, 14, 8] .
In this paper, we focus on the pure location game [1] . It sacrifices nonexistence of Nash equilibrium in the original pure location game. Eaton et al. [7] first show there is no Nash equilibrium when there are 3 agents in the onedimensional space. Shaked et al. [16] extend the non-existence to two-dimensional space. Thereafter Osborne et al. [12] show the Nash equilibrium does not exist in a wide range of settings when there are more than 2 agents. However, a mixed Nash equilibrium is guaranteed to exist [4, 17] . This result is not obvious considering that the utility functions in these games are not continuous with the action. Generally, a mixed Nash equilibrium is not guaranteed to exist in such games.
The original Hotelling-Downs model suffers from some problematic assumptions: customers always choose the nearest shop without considering the distance, contradicting to the fact that a shop is no more attractive to a customer if it is too far away. Furthermore, customers choose the shop without considering competing shops, while in daily life, it is hard to say which shop attracts more customers if two shops are close enough with similar products. These issues are also discussed in [9] .
To address the above issues, we consider the Hotelling-Downs model with limited attraction, proposed in [9] . In this model, all firms (called agents hereafter) only attract customers (called clients hereafter) in a limited distance, and if a client is attracted by multiple agents, the client picks one from those agents with equal chance.
We analyze the Nash equilibria with two utility functions for agents: support utility and winner utility(i.e., winner takes all setting in [9] ). In the support utility setting, agents focus on maximizing the number of its clients, modeling the commercial competitions. While in winner utility setting, the winner in the competition takes all the utility, which is typical for the political voting.
We extend the results on uniform distribution in [9] to arbitrary distributions. First of all, we consider the existence of pure Nash equilibrium. In support utility setting, when the distribution is uniform and agents have the same attracting distance(called width hereafter), the existence of Nash equilibra can shown by simply constructing one. However, the method does not work any more under other distribution. We solve this problem by formulating it as a potential game. In winner utility maximization setting, to our knowledge, there is no tool to guarantee the existence of Nash equilibria in games with such utility functions. However, we show that a pure Nash equilibrium does exist in some simple cases.
Secondly, we study fairness and price of anarchy of Nash equilibria in support utility setting (both of which are straightforward in the winner utility setting). We give tight bounds on both criteria.
Results and contributions
• In the support utility maximization setting, support utility is continuous. Applying Glicksberg's theorem [10] , continuous game guarantees a mixed Nash equilibrium. If we let the agents dynamically best respond to the other's locations (one agent each round), then the location profile converges to a Nash equilibrium. Scrutinizing each agent's action, each improvement actually increases a potential function. Thus the game admits a pure Nash equilibrium.
• In the winner utility maximization setting, the winner utility is not continuous any more. The game is somehow harder to analyze. We restrict the problem to the case when the agents have the same width. We prove that when there are at most 3 agents, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium. Three-agents case is very special in other variants [7, 16, 17] . The existence of Nash equilibrium complements their results. If the agent's width is at least half of the client space, then there also exists a Nash equilibrium for any number of agents.
• We study fairness and price of anarchy of Nash equilibria in support utility setting (both of which are straightforward in the winner utility setting). We show that the fairness criterion can be bounded by 1 2 w M /wm , where w M = max{w} and w m = min{w}. We also prove that the price of anarchy at least The structure of this paper is as follows: In Section 2 , we describe the coined Hotelling-Downs model with limited attraction in [9] . In Section 3, we prove the existence of the Nash equilibrium in support-utility maximization setting. In Section 4, we construct a Nash equilibrium in winner utility maximization setting. In Section 5, the support utilities in Nash equilibrium are compared. In Section 6, the price of anarchy is given and we give an upper bound on the amount of clients have not been served. Let x denote the joint location profile (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ), and x −i denote the profile without i, i.e. (x 1 , ..., x i−1 , x i+1 ..., x n ). Given x, let congestion function c(x, x) be the the number of attraction intervals covering point x, c(x, x) = #{x i |x ∈ R i } Clearly, the following equation holds:
For simplicity, we use c(x) instead of c(x, x) when there is no ambiguity. If a point x is covered by multiple attraction intervals (i.e., c(x) ≥ 2), then the support of that point is evenly divided among all these agents. Agent i's support s i is then defined to be the total support from his attraction interval:
In our model, we assume that the distribution function f (x) and the width w i , ∀i are publicly known. We consider two kinds of utility settings: support utility and winner utility. The support utility setting uses the support function as agents' utility function. In the winner utility setting, only agents with the largest support are considered to be the winners, and share a total utility of 1 equally among them, while other agents have utility 0. Note that in the winner utility setting, each agent only cares about whether he is a winner and the number of winners, since if the agent is a winner, he has a higher utility when there are less winners.
Formally, an attraction game is defined as follows:
, where:
• N = (1, 2, . . . , n) is the set of all agents;
• w = (w 1 , w 2 , . . . , w n ) is the widths associated to agents;
is the set of all possible location profiles, where
. . , u n ) is the utility functions for the agents, the definition of which depends on the setting we consider:
-in the support utility setting,
-in the winner utility setting,
where W denotes the winner set.
A Nash equilibrium of game G is a stable location profile, where no agent can deviate to another location to get a higher utility.
Definition 2 (Nash equilibrium). Given a game G, the set of Nash equilibra N E(G) contains all location profiles x, such that ∀i ∈ N and ∀x i ∈ L i ,
In different utility settings, the definitions of the utility functions are different, and thus have distinct Nash equilibria. Consider the following example:
Example. Assume that the clients are distributed uniformly. There are 3 agents with widths w 1 = 0. 
The support of the 3 agents are
In the support utility setting, the profile x does not form a Nash equilibrium, since given x −2 , agent 2 has incentive to deviate to 0.55. And by doing so, u 2 increases as R 2 has less intersection with R 3 . However, in the winner utility setting, the profile x forms a Nash equilibrium and agent 1 is the unique winner.
Existence of Nash equilibrium in support utility setting
A well known theorem of Glicksberg [10] states that every continuous game has a mixed Nash equilibrium. By definition,
Agent i's support utility is continuous with x i . According to Glicksberg's theorem, there exists a mixed Nash equilibrium in this setting. However, due to the special structure of our model, we could further show that a pure Nash equilibrium always exists. The game can be viewed as a congestion game where the resources are the densities associated to each point. It is known that every finite congestion game has a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Although agents's action space is infinitely in the game, we can still show that a pure strategy Nash equilibrium exists.
Theorem 1.
There exists a pure Nash equilibrium in the support utility setting.
Proof. Given other agents' locations x −i , agent i's support utility can be written as
If agent i prefers x i to x i , we have
On both sides of the inequality, we add the following term
The left side of inequality becomes
Similarly, we can get the right side and the inequality becomes
If we start from an arbitrary location profile, many agents' strategies are not optimal. Then in each round, we let one agent to better respond to other agents' strategies. By equation (1), each time one agent improves his support utility, he actually improves a potential function,
The potential function can be upper bounded,
Combined the fact Φ( x) is continuous with x, we have that Φ( x) has a maximum value. In the location profile x * = arg max x Φ( x), no agent can improve his support utility and thus it is a Nash equilibrium.
Noticing that the above proof does not use the fact of one-dimension space, and the result can be extended to multi-dimensional space.
Corollary 1.
There is a pure Nash equilibrium in the support utility maximization setting if the location space is multi-dimensional.
existence of nash equilibrium in winner utility setting
In winner utility setting, the utility of agent i is no longer continuous with respect to the agent's location. The potential function in the support-utilitymaximizing setting does not work.
Definition 3.
A game is an ordinal potential game, if there is a function φ :
It seems difficult to design a potential function to prove NE existence, the reason is the following theorem.
Theorem 2. Winner utility maximization game is not an ordinal potential game.
We prove by contradiction.
Proof. Consider the distribution function is
There are three agents with same width w = 1/3. We give two different paths from the location profile (1/6,1/6,1/6) to (1/6,1/6,5/6).
Path 1: (1/6, 1/6, 1/6) → (1/6, 1/6, 5/9) → (1/6, 5/9, 5/9) → (1/6, 5/9, 5/6) → (1/6, 1/6, 5/6) Path 2: (1/6, 1/6, 1/6) → (1/6, 1/6, 5/6). Suppose there exists a potential function Φ. In Path 1, u 3 decreases in the first step, u 2 decreases in the second step. The support utility of the deviating agent does not change in the following steps. By definition of Φ, we should have Φ(1/6, 1/6, 5/6) < Φ(1/6, 1/6, 1/6).
In Path 2, u 3 increases in the first step. By definition, we should have Φ(1/6, 1/6, 5/6) > Φ(1/6, 1/6, 1/6), contradiction.
In this setting, there exists a new strategy that an agent increase winner utility by decreasing the support utility of both winner and himself. Consider the following example.
Example. Let the distribution f (x) be When we consider winner utility maximization setting, we restrict to the case all agents have the same width w i = w. First we prove a lemma which will be used frequently. This lemma roughly gives a situation where two agents have no incentive to deviate. Proof. By definition of x A and x B , we have 
which is same as agent B's support utility.
For the second part, we prove by contradiction. Suppose A moves to x A and gets more support utility than B, then
which contradicts to the fact that x B is a best location. Since A and B are symmetric, agent B cannot get more support utility than A neither.
When there are 2 agents, we put both agents at the same position where maximizes [x−w/2,x+w/2] f (y) dy. By setting k = 0 in Lemma 1, we know both agents are winners. Either one cannot become the unique winner by deviating. Thus the location profile constitutes a Nash equilibrium.
Theorem 3.
There is a pure Nash equilibrium when there are 2 agents.
When there are 3 agents, the problem becomes quite complicated. Since there is no symmetric property, there are many cases to consider when we are checking the stable equilibrium. We propose Algorithm 1 for 3 agents.
• Let u 1 denote the largest support utility that the first player could achieve, i.e. u 1 is the maximum value of x+w/2 x−w/2 f (y) dy.
• Case 1: If we can allocate three agents at the same time such that everyone achieves the support utility u 1 , then we allocate them at those three locations.
• Case 2: If we can allocate only two agents at the same time such that every one achieves the support utility u 1 , then we allocate agent 1 at one of the two locations, the other two agents together at the other location.
• Otherwise, we can allocate only one agent that achieves the support utility u 1 . There exists a set of locations that agent 1 achieves the support utility u 1 , we allocate agent 1 at the leftmost one, denoted by x 1 . Given agent 1's location, let the largest support utility for agent 2 is u 2 .
-Case 3: If agent 2 can achieve support utility u 2 at location x 1 , we allocate agents 2 and 3 together at x 1 .
-Case 4: Otherwise, if on both left side and right side of agent 1, there exists locations where agent 2 achieves support utility u 2 . We allocate agent 2 at the rightmost position in the left part and agent 3 at the leftmost position in the right part, i.e.,
-Case 5: Otherwise, the locations that maximize agent 2's support utility lie on the same side of agent 1. We allocate agent 2 to the closest position and agent 3 at the farthest position. Let
If t 2 < x 1 , then set x 2 = t 3 , x 3 = t 2 . Otherwise, set x 2 = t 2 , x 3 = t 3 .
Theorem 4. When there are 3 agents, Algorithm 1 gives a pure Nash equilibrium.
Here is the idea of Algorithm 1. In most of time we allocate agent 1 where he gets the largest support utility. Then we allocate agent 2 and 3 to get the largest support utility as possible. Agent 2 and 3 have the same support utility and hinder each other. If agent 2 wants to get the same support utility as agent 1 by decreasing both u 1 and u 2 , then u 3 becomes the largest, and agent 3 is the unique winner. Thus the location profile forms a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. The proof follows algorithm's structure. In each case, we consider who wins and whether the agents' attraction intervals intersect. In all cases, we prove no one has incentive to deviate.
In Case 1, winner set is {1, 2, 3}. Keeping agent 2's location fixed, by Lemma 1, agent 1 cannot get more support utility than agent 3.
Thus if agent 1 moves, the other two agents have at least the same support utility. Using similar arguments, no one gets more support utility than any other player. So on one has incentive to deviate.
In Case 2, winner set is {1}. Since agent 2 and 3 are at the same location, we only need to prove agent 2 does not have incentive to deviate. We prove by contradiction. Let agent 2 could become a winner by deviating to x 2 . Let R 2 denote the corresponding attraction interval. If R 2 does not intersect with R 1 , agent 1 always has more support utility than agent 2. Then R 2 intersects with R 1 . For same reason, R 2 intersects with R 3 . Without agent 3, agent 2 has at most the same support utility as agent 1. But R 3 only has intersection with R 2 , this intersection makes agent 2 have strictly less support utility than the agent 1. So agent 2 cannot become a winner and nobody has incentive to deviate.
In Case 3, winner set is {1, 2, 3}. Since they have the same location, we only need to prove agent 3 has no incentive to deviate. Suppose agent 3 has incentive to deviate to x 3 with attraction interval R 3 , then he must become the unique winner. Formally,
Consider the situation when only agent 1 has been located. The left side of the inequality is agent 2's support utility by choosing x 3 . The right side of the inequality is agent 2's support utility by choosing x 1 . That means agent 2 gets more support utility by choosing x 3 than choosing x 1 , contradicting to the assumption. Hence agent 3 has no incentive to deviate.
In Case 4, we have u 2 = u 3 by Lemma 1. There are 3 possibilities about who the winners are.
Case 4.1:Winner set is {2, 3}. Agent 2 and 3 have no incentive to deviate by Lemma 1. We next prove agent 1 has no incentive to deviate. If R 2 ∩ R 1 = ∅, agent 3 cannot have more support utility than agent 1. So we have R 2 ∩ R 1 = ∅ and R 1 ∩ R 3 = ∅. We consider whether R 2 ∩ R 3 is empty.
Case 4.1.1: R 2 ∩ R 3 = ∅. Suppose agent 1 benefits by deviating to x 1 . Let 
This is the agent 3's support utility after agent 1's deviation. Agent 1 cannot become a winner. If R 1 ∩ R 3 = ∅ and R 1 ∩ (R 3 − R 2 ) = ∅, then we have
This is the agent 3's support utility after agent 1's deviation. If R 1 ∩ (R 3 − R 2 ) = ∅. Since agent 1 has at least the same support utility as agent 2, we have
Case 5: first we claim winner set can not be {2, 3}. By definition, we have R 3 ∩ R 1 ⊂ R 3 ∩ R 2 . We consider u 1 , u 2 when there are only agent 1 and 2, then we take count into the impact of agent 3.
We have u 1 ≥ u 2 . Thus if agent 2 is a winner, agent 1 is a winner too. Case 5.1: winner set is {1}. In this sub-case, the argument is independent with the leftmost property of x 1 . Then w.l.o.g. we assume x 1 < x 2 ≤ x 3 . Agent 1 has no incentive to deviate. Suppose agent 2 deviate to
, agent 3 has strictly more support utility than agent 2. If x 2 ∈ (x 2 , x 3 ], agent 1's support utility weakly increase, agent 2's support utility is weakly smaller than agent 3's. Agent 3's support utility weakly decreases. Then agent 1 has strictly more support utility than agent 2. Thus agent 2 would not deviate. Suppose agent 3 deviates to x 3 . If x 3 ∈ [0, x 2 ) ∪ (x 3 , 1], then agent 2 has strictly more support utility than agent 3. If x 3 ∈ [x 2 , x 3 ), agent 3 has weakly less support utility than agent 2. But the support utility difference between agent 2 and agent 1 becomes larger. Thus agent 3 would not deviate.
Case 5.2: winner set is {1, 2, 3}. The proof that agent 2 and 3 have no incentive to deviate is same as in Case 5.1. Since u 1 = u 2 and by Equation (2) and (3), we have R 2 ∩ R 3 = ∅. Since u 1 = u 2 , x 2 is also a best choice for agent 1 at the beginning. By the leftmost property of x 1 , we know x 1 < x 2 . Suppose agent 1 deviates to x 1 . If x 1 ∈ [0, x 1 ) ∪ (x 1 , x 2 ), agent 1 has strictly less support utility than agent 2. If x 1 ∈ [x 2 , 1) and R 1 ∩ R 3 = ∅, agent 1 has strictly less support utility than agent 3.
This is agent 2's support utility after deviation. Agent 1 has strictly less support utility than agent 2. Hence in case 5.2, no agent would deviate.
When w = 0.5, the attraction intervals overlap in general. We make use of this property and give Algorithm 2 to construct a Nash equilibrium with width 0.5.
• Let u 1 denote the largest support utility that agent 1 could achieve, i.e.
• If we can allocate 2 agents at the same time such that everyone achieves the support utility u 1 , i.e.
[0,0
When there are k agents, we allocate k/2 agents at 0.25 and k − k/2 agents at 0.75.
• If we can allocate only one agent that achieves the support utility u 1 , then we allocate the first agent at x 1 . Define t such that everyone in the first t agents maximizes the support utility at x 1 given the previous agents' locations, but this no longer holds for the (t + 1)-th agent.
-When there are k ≤ t + 1 agent, we allocate them together at x 1 .
-When there are k ≥ t + 2 agent, let x = (x, ..., x) (the number of x is k − 2). We define left largest support utility ll(x) and right largest support utility rl(x):
ll(x) = max c(y) dy = rl(x * ). We put the first k−2 agents at x * , (k−1)-th agent at x l , k-th agent at x r .
In the second case and when there are more than k ≥ t + 2 agents, based on the width is 0.5 the union of the support of (k − 1)-th agent and k-th agent will cover the support of previous agents. In fact, the (k − 1)-th and k-th agents are the unique two winners.
Theorem 5. When w = 0.5, Algorithm 2 gives a Nash equilibrium.
The main proof is omitted due to the space. We only prove that Algorithm 2 could find a location profile, i.e., there exists x * such that ll(x * ) = rl(x * ) when there are k ≥ t + 2 agents in the second case.
Proof. When the first k − 2 agents located at x 1 , suppose the support utility of the (k − 1)th agent is maximized at x 2 . In fact, we can prove
Since ll(x) is continuous and weakly increasing while rl(x) is continuous and weakly decreasing, x * exists.
For smaller width, the attraction interval may not overlap. This results new possibilities of the interval intersection relationship, and many possibilities about who is the winner. Hence the proof does not hold for smaller width.
Lemma 2.
If there always exists a Nash equilibrium when w = 0.5, then it also holds for w ≥ 0.5.
In this case, the interval (1−w, w) belongs to every agent's support. The idea is we can remove this interval and the problem becomes proving the existence of Nash equilibrium with w = 0.5.
Proof. When w > 0.5, we can construct a Nash equilibrium from an instance with w = 0.5. We let the new distribution function be
Suppose there is a Nash equilibrium (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ) under distribution g with width 0.5. We can verify that ((2 − 2w)x 1 + w − 0.5, (2 − 2w)x 2 + w − 0.5, ...(2 − 2w)x n + w − 0.5) forms a Nash equilibrium in the distribution f and with width w.
Fairness in the Nash equilibrium
Definition 4 (Fairness). Given a game G, define the fairness of the game to be:
Intuitively, given a location profile x, the ratio mini ui( x) maxi ui( x) describes how fairly the utilities are divided among all agents. We choose the lowest such ratio of Nash equilibria as our fairness criterion.
In the winner utility setting, The fairness is simply 0 if there exists a losing agent, or 1 otherwise. In the support utility setting, the fairness is generally not easy to compute. However, we give a tight lower bound in such a setting.
We first give a lemma that bounds the ratio
maxi ui( x) for any Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. The utility of agent i is at least 1 2 wj /wi fraction of the utility of agent j. The bound is tight.
Proof. In support utility maximization setting, we have
The idea is to split the interval (x j − w j /2, x j + w j /2) into many small intervals with size w j , and apply the inequality on them:
There are two agents with the same width 1/2, (x 1 = 0.25, x 2 = 0.75) is a Nash equilibrium. We can see the ratio of support utility between two agent meets the bound 1/2.
Suppose agent 1 has the largest support utility, agent n has the smallest support utility, we can easily get the ratio between the largest and smallest support utility is The price of anarchy is an important metric that measures how efficiency decrease due to agents' selfish behaviors. In particular, we define the price of anarchy as follows:
Definition 5 (Price of anarchy). Given a game G, the price of anarchy of the game is
If we consider PoA in the winner utility maximization setting, the sum of the utility is always 1. There is no inefficiency. If we consider amount of uncovered support in the winner utility maximization setting, the upper bound could reach 1, which has a poor performance. To make the problem interesting, we mainly consider the support utility maximization setting.
First, consider the price of anarchy.
Theorem 7. The price of anarchy of the support utility maximization is at least 1 2 . The bound is tight. Proof. Suppose the optimal location profile that maximizes the sum of support utilities is x * = (x * 1 , x * 2 , ..., x * n ), and the Nash equilibrium location profile is (x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n ). The sum of support utilities in x * is upper bounded by adding n agents with location x,
Thus, P oA ≥ 1/2.
Actually, when n goes to infinity, the poa can be arbitrarily close to 1/2. Consider the example, there are n agents with the same width 1/n.
f (x) = The optimal location profile is ( . The support utility in this Nash equilibrium is n 2n−1 . When n goes to infinity, the PoA converges to 1/2.
Then we can consider how many clients are not served.
Theorem 8. The support of the uncovered clients is at most
Proof. We let p denote the "uncovered support", q denote "covered support". Suppose We split the interval [0, 1] into pieces with size w 1 .If we don't count agent 1, then in each small pieces, the support of the uncovered set is at most u 1 . Otherwise, agent 1 will deviate to cover this interval. Then the sum of the uncovered support is at most 
